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BOOK. REVIEWS
PUBLIC CONTROL OF ECONOmIIC ENTERPRISE. By Harold Koontz and Richard W.
Gable. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956. Pp. XII, 851. $7.00.
In this book the authors have. interpreted the phrase "public control" to include
the broad fiscal and monetary controls over the level of economic activity, direct
government economic activity, regulation of collective bargaining, and positive
aids to certain sectors of the economy, as well as specific regulation of industries
affected with a public interest and the maintenance of competition through anti-
trust statutes. The book thus attempts to cover the topics incorporated in most
of the courses in applied economics customarily included in the undergraduate
curriculum.
This reviewer agrees that this is "an area of inquiry and analysis which is
not only of significance to persons in business, but also to the general public
whose material wants the economic system is designed to satisfy and whose
economic freedom is often closely related to political and social freedom." 1 But
this is equivalent to saying that it would be desirable for all citizens to have
majored in economics as undergraduates! Professors Koontz and Gable have
provided, in 851 pages, a basis on which an intelligent citizen might make up for
such a deficiency in his formal education. For this purpose the book must com-
pete more with the many introductory economics textbooks than with the books
concerned with what is commonly called "social control of business."
Like far too many of the texts on social control, but unlike most general intro-
ductions to economics, the authors have not included a systematic exposition of
the pure economic theory which is implicitly used in their analyses of questions
of public policy. This omission may serve to make the book more attractive to
the citizen attempting to understand the complexities of our economic institutions
on his own, but it makes the book of less value as a teaching aid for class use.
For the general reader it is an excellent introduction to economic problems, and
the carefully selected references at the end of each chapter provide a basis for
continued study by those whose appetites are sufficiently whetted.2
The book includes twenty-eight chapters grouped into eight parts entitled: "The
Setting of Economic Control," "Transportation," "Public Utilities," "Maintaining
Competition," "Protecting the Investor," "Labor," "Public Promotion and Owner-
ship of Economic Enterprise," and "Public Control of the Total Economy." In
Part One the authors began with a very brief outline of the development of the
economic institutions of American capitalism from medieval times to the present.
More historical perspective is provided, however, in later chapters in the treat-
ment of some of the other seven topics.
In the limited space of 120 pages, Professors Koontz and Gable have provided
a very concise treatment of government regulation of transportation. This sec-
tion can serve as a good introduction to this topic. The authors give references
to many textbooks on the economics of transportation. In view of the current
increase in interest of economists and others in this important area of public
policy, it is particularly interesting to note the authors' conclusions on the re-
quisites of a sound national transportation policy. In discussing the relation of
the antitrust laws to interstate carriers, the authors express approval of exemp-
1. p. vii.
2. This reviewer has adopted the book as a text for a course in current eco-
nomic problems.
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tions from the antitrust statutes provided by the Transporation Act of 1920 and
the Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948. They state: "While such broad exemption of
the interstate carriers from the federal antitrust laws has been criticized as
being inimical to the operation of competition, it is difficult to conceive a system
of iegulation in which such exemption would not be made." 3 In the following
chapter' they list as an example of government interference with management's
quest for efficiency the "limitations placed by public policy on efficient combina-
tions of carriers," and the "artificial separations of railroads, water carriers,
motor carriers, and airlines." .- The authors continue: "It is certainly reasonable
to argue that government policy should either consistently aim at making com-
petition effective or at promoting monopoly and gaining its fruits. It should
hardly try to do both."G After these statements, it is rather surprising to find
the conclusion that there is "neither the justification nor the inclination to depart
from the tradition of competition in American transportation industry." At this
point they further state: "Perhaps the protections of antitrust regulations would
be adequate to maintain effective competition in transportation as it does in many
other industries." This reviewer agrees that the pattern of control developed
for railroads prior to the entry of motor and air carriers into the maket should
not be continued. It seems particularly important, however, to guard against
the relaxation of direct government controls unless there is a simultaneous re-
laxation of the exemptions from antitrust policy which have been granted to
firms in the transport field. Perhaps we can gain the fruits of monopoly, with
direct regulation protecting the public interest, while relaxing direct regulation
wherever competition among carriers and among types of carriers is capable
of protecting the public interest under the antitrust law policy. This whole
question of transportation policy is one which urgently needs careful considera-
tion by an informed public. Professors Koontz and Gable have raised some im-
portant questions but provided few answers.
It less than 100 pages, Part Three provides an excellent textbook on the eco-
ormics of public utilities. Chapter nine concisely and thoroughly covers the legal
development of the public utility concept along with economic criteria for policy
decisions. The other three chapters in this part of the book provide a very use-
ful source of reference on current statutes in this field.
In Part Four the authors have devoted 115 pages to antitrust policy. The
first of four chapters in this section discusses the meaning of competition and
the goals of public policy and evaluates the published evidence on the question
of whether competition has declined. The authors state: "Much of the confusion
and misunderstanding over the characteristics of the competitive system arise
from the fact that it is both a myth and a model."s Professors Koontz and Gable
thus raise the question of the scope and nature of economic theory and its relation
to public policy. They state that:
The model has never existed . . . . However, the model is a useful device,
because it provides a standard against which existing conditions can be
measured. The competitive system as a myth, on the other hand, is neither a
tfliortical wode( nor a description of reality. It is the expression of value
goals, a prescription rather than description, a statement of what "ought to
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Public policy that does not recognize this distinction is doomed to failure,
because any attempt to achieve, as the goal of public policy, a system that
did not, does not, and cannot exist is futile. Perhaps somewhere between
the model of perfect competition and pure monopoly there is an area of
"effective" competition that is both a feasible and desirable goal of public
policy.9
Since the model of pure monopoly is, like the competitive model, a very useful
but, nevertheless, a very abstract concept, it seems to this reviewer unlikely that
the illusive "effective competition" will be found "between" these two abstract
concepts. The search for a new concept-i.e., a workable concept of competition
which can serve as a "feasible and desirable goal of public policy," has produced
a great many useful contributions' o to the literature of antitrust problems in the
past two decades. No one, however, has developed a rigorous, abstract model of a
market economy which can serve as a realistic description of the economic organ-
ization which we desire and which is embodied in the "myth" of competition. 1
One of the most important implications of the recent attempts to evolve a
concept of "effective" or "workable" competition has been not only to make clear
the distinction which Professors Koontz and Gable emphasize between competition
as the vaguely defined complex of values deeply rooted in our society, and com-
petition as an analytical concept, but also to show the necessity of using abstract
models in an ad toc, flexible manner rather than as doctrine. It seems to this
reviewer that the most important function which the economist can perform in
discussing public policy with respect to industrial organization is to focus atten-
tion upon the less obvious relationships between the institutional framework of
free business enterprise and the complex set of social goals masked by the "myth
of competition."
Such analyses of the effects of the structure of markets and business practices
on the fulfillment of the social goals can undoubtedly be improved by advances
in economic theory--i.e., by development of new models with different assump-
tions to obtain new propositions to give better insight into the workings of our
economic organization. One cannot expect a book of the type here reviewed to
make new contributions to economic theory. It is disappointing, however, that
a book so excellent in other respects does not make better use of the competitive
model which the authors acknowledge to be a useful device. The general reader
who lacks a background in economic theory might have been better served if a
little more space had been devoted to an exposition of some of the analytical
concepts which enable economists-albeit, without unanimity-to interpret the
observed facts underlying policy decisions. About the model of perfect competi-
tion the authors say that in this sense:
[T]he competitive system is only a concept, a model by which to measure
the varying degrees of imperfection that characterize the actual market
condition. Perfect competition presupposes a homogeneous commodity, many
sellers and buyers, all acting independently and with full information of
market conditions, mobility of productive factors, and no artificial barriers
9. p. 299.
10. See Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AIEn. ECON.
Ruv. 241 (1940); Report of the Attorney-General's National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws, Washington, 1955, c. VII.
11. The monopolistic competition models developed by CHAMBERLIN in THETHEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMIPETITION (1933) were abstract models intermediate
between pure competition and pure monopoly. Those theoretical developmentswere useful contributions to the economist's "analytical tool box" primarily be-
cause their development necessitated a more rigorous statement of the assump-tions and propositions i volved in the models of pure competition and pure
monopoly. It was after the widespread dissemination of Chamberlin's work that
John . Clark gave impetus to the search for new ideas of quite a different sort.
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to entering or leaving an industry. Under such conditions keen rivalry
between buyers and between sellers would result, for no individual buyer
or seller would be able to gain market dominance.12
It is difficut to see how one could logically deduce from the assumptions of
perfect competition the proposition that "keen rivalry" would result. Instead,
each seller would be able to sell all he wished at the going market price, and
would have no incentive to sell below that price. In a market characterized by
perfect competition there would be a complete absence of "rivalry" between
firms, if "rivalry" is given its ordinary meaning. The careful use of the com-
petitive model as a standard by which to evaluate the effectiveness of competition
in an actual market might lead the economic analyst to look behind the rivalry
in, for example, the automobile market and to raise questions about freedom
of entry, independence of firms, technological (as opposed to styling) innovations,
the existence of economies of scale, alternative products and services available
to the buyers, and many other things. Yet the authors state that: "Existence of
a few large firms in an industry does not necessarily imply that workable com-
petition does not exist among them. One would hardly say, for example, that the
automobile industry ... has not been vigorously competitive."'13 The model of
perfect competition assumes "many sellers." In automobile manufacturing only a
very few firms exist. This, of course, does not justify a conclusion that competition
is ineffective. But the existence of rivalry does not justify the opposite conclusion.
In discussing price rigidity Professors Koontz and Gable cite a report of the
House Committee on Small Business showing that between 1920 and 1936 prices
in six "concentrated" industries did not decrease as much as unit labor require-
ments, while in several "non-concentrated" industries prices were reduced more
than unit labor requirements. They state:
Of even greater significance [than absolute changes in prices] to economic
welfare is the extent to which, over an extended period of time, the benefits
of technological improvements are passed along to consumers in the form
of lower prices. Price reductions are not extensively used in concentrated
industries as a means of increasing output to compensate for decrease in
unit labor requirements, whereas in the nonconcentrated industries price
decreases tended to parallel reductions in unit labor requirements. 4
Although the authors went on to say that the "existence of price rigidities is
not always due to an absence of competition," the general reader not familiar
with the abstract concepts of economic theory might conclude that the authors
are endorsing the comparison of relative prices over time and relative unit labor
requirements as a measure of the degree to which the benefits of technological
improvements are passed on to the consumer. The economic models explained
in most elementary economic textbooks, although abstract and not descriptive
of the real world, can be quite useful in evaluating such findings of fact as here
presented. For example, the elementary theory of price and resource allocation
might lead one to ask whether labor saving technological innovations, even if
prices are not reduced, will increase general welfare by releasing labor for use
in other ways. One might ask whether unit labor requirements have decreased
because the price of labor has risen relative to other factors of production, in
which case the total unit cost may not have been reduced because of the sub-
stitution of other costs for labor costs. Since the pure theory would lead us to
expect that concentration would be correlated with the capital requirements re-
lative to labor, the discrepancy between the "concentrated" and "non-concen-
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labor costs in two types of industries. Theory might also suggest the possibility
of capital-saving technological innovations which might increase unit labor re-
quirements.
In the opinion of this reviewer, this book would have been a much more
valuable contribution if Professors Koontz and Gable had chosen to include a
more intensive analysis of each topic even at the expense of much narrower
coverage.
Each of the eight parts consists of a very brief treatment of a very complex
set of policy problems. The most important institutional arrangements relevant
to each topic are briefly described. With the references cited at the end of each
chapter and in the footnotes, each of these parts of the book can serve as a very
good introduction to the topic which it treats. Perhaps the work would have
better served the public interest as well as that of the publisher if the "tying
contract" implicit in the binding had not been used! For the general reader as
well as for classroom use, seven or eight paperbacks priced at $1.00 each would
have provided more alternatives to the buyer and might have enabled entry
into several markets.
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